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The Theory of the State: An Economic Perspective 
 
The principle of laissez- faire, so closely associated with Adam Smith and the classical 
economists, should certainly not be considered an endorsement of anarchy as the ideal 
form of social order. Despite the theological overtones of divine providence in the 
imagery of the “invisible hand”, Smith and his followers did not regard the market and 
the price mechanism as a spontaneous form of natural order that would prevail in any 
social group. Political organization in some form is necessary to provide the framework 
of law and order within which justice could be maintained and contracts enforced. Thus 
even one of their harshest critics, Thomas Carlyle, described their system not as anarchy, 
but as “anarchy plus the constable”. 
 
The necessity of the “state” in the sense of the institution that claims a monopoly of the 
legitimate use of force over a given territory, or as Max Weber (1964, p. 154) defined it, 
for the proper functioning of “the market” and indeed of all forms of civilized human 
endeavor, can be traced back to the seminal influence of The Leviathan, 
the foundation of modern political thought laid by Thomas Hobbes (1651). 
 
 
Hobbes deduced the need for a sovereign state from his analysis of the nature of man: 
 “In the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, 
Competition; Secondly Diffidence; Thirdly Glory. The first maketh men invade for Gain; 
the second for Safety; and the third for Reputation … Hereby it is manifest that during 
the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that 
condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every 
man…. In such conditions there is no place for Industry… And the life of man [is] 
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“[I]t is a precept, or a generall rule of reason, That every man, ought to endeavour 
Peace, as fare as he has hope of obtaining it” from which it follows “That a man be 
willing, when others are so too, as forte-forth,, as for Peace, and defence of himselfe he 
shall think it necessary, to lay down the right to all things; and be content with so much 
liberty, as he would allow other men against himselfe” (Ibid. Part I, ch. XIV, p 190)  
 
However, “Convenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no 
strength to secure a man at all” (Ibid. Part II, ch. XVII, p 223). There is, 
therefore need for a Sovereign  
 
“[whose] “Power, cannot, without his consent, be Transferred to another. 
He cannot forfeit it; he cannot be Accused by any of his Subjects of 
Injury; he cannot be punished by them: He is Judge of what is necessary 
for Peace; a Judge of Doctrines: He is Sole Legislator; and Supreme Judge 
of Controversies; and of the Times and Occasions of Warre, and Peace: to 
him belongeth to choose Magistrates, Counsellors, Commanders and all 
other Officers and Ministers; and to determine the Rewards, and 
Punisshments, Honour and Order”  (Ibid. Part II, ch. 20, pp. 252-253) 
 
 Hobbes acknowledged that “a man may… object that the 
Condition of Subjects is very miserable; as being obnoxious to the lusts, 
and other irregular passions of him, or them that have so unlimited a 
Power in their hands ” What protects the subjects from excessive 
exploitation is the fact that, “the greatest pressure of Sovereign Governors 
proceeds not from any delight, or profit they can expect in the damage, or 
weakening of their Subjects, in whose vigor, consisteth their own strength 
or glory” (Ibid. Part II, ch. 19 p. 238), To put it in terms of economic 
analysis: the well-being of the subjects is an argument in the Sovereign’s 
utility function.  
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 For the purpose of exploration of the economic implications of 
Hobbes’s analysis, we present, in Section 1, a model in which consumer 
goods and services are competitively produced in the private sector, while 
the State is the sole provider of an intermediate public good, such as “Law 
and Order” and the maintenance of infrastructure such as roads, bridges 
and harbors. The executive authorities or “State Governors” obtain funds 
through taxation, and decide on the proportion of the tax revenue to 
allocate to the production of the public good and what proportion to 
consume themselves. 
 
 To obtain a benchmark, we look in Section 2 at the case of a  
“Philosopher-King”, a Sovereign who cares only about his subjects’ well-
being, and who has no wants of his own. We determine the level of 
production of the public good that is optimal from the point of view of the 
polity, and the corresponding socially optimal rate of taxation. Next 
(Section 3) we examine the optimal size if government from the point of 
view of labor and capital as separate “factions”. 
 
  We then return to the problems facing an absolute ruler, and, in 
Section 4 we consider the case of a Leviathan, whose only goal is the 
maximization of his own (the government’s) consumption.. We show that 
an unconstrained autocrat who can freely choose the tax rate will provide 
the same volume of public goods, and his realm will reach the same 
income level, as one ruled by a Philosopher King. The Leviathan will, 
 4
however, appropriate the entire “surplus” created by the public good, 
leaving the population no better off than it would be in the absence of a 
government. 
  
 The polity may defend itself against exploitation by limiting the  
tax rate  which the Leviathan is permitted to set. In Section 5 we show that 
it is in the interest of a tax-constrained Leviathan to provide a volume of 
public goods that is less than optimal from the point of view of the polity. 
The higher the tax, the greater the volume of public goods provided by the 
Leviathan. But the higher the tax rate, the greater the “Surplus” which he 
is able to appropriate for himself. Such considerations give rise to a 
“principal – agent” problem between Parliament, which controls taxes in 
order to limit the degree of exploitation by the Ruler, and the Ruler, who 
allocates the tax proceeds so as to maximize his own consumption.  We 
show that such a division of powers results in a lower supply of the public 
intermediate good, and a lower aggregate output, than in the fully 
autocratic or benevolent systems.  
 
 
1. The Basic Model  
“Real national income”, conceived as a Hicksian composite 
commodity, is specified as: 
                               
   Y = A(Lg) F(Lp   K)        (1.1) 
with 
      Lg + Lp = L               (1.2) 
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where Lg and Lp  are labor employed in the government and private sectors 
respectively, with K and L denoting the fixed available supplies of labor 
and capital. The key assumptions are about the public intermediate input 
A(Lg). These are that: 
 A′(Lg )> 0; A″( Lg ) < 0;  A(0) =1      (1.3) 
while the function F is assumed to be homogenous of the first degree in Lp 
and K with positive first and negative second derivatives with respect to L 
and K. 
 In the absence of the state, i.e. in the Hobbesian “state of nature” we 
have: 
 Y = A(0)F(L,K) = Yo         (1.4)          
which corresponds to the output attainable under anarchy. Since agents 
have to provide their own “defense” and “law and order” it stands to 
reason that output would be substantially below what it would be if these 
functions were handed over to appointed officials, and agents in the 
private sector could specialize on their own gainful activities with security 
of life and property assured by the state. 
 
 To do this, the state must have the power to levy taxes, which for 
simplicity we assume to be proportional to the personal incomes of the 
factors of production. Labor is free to choose public or private 
employment, so that the after-tax wage must be the same in both sectors. 
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Assuming perfectly competitive markets the after-tax wage in the private 
sector is therefore given by: 
 (1-t)A(Lg) ∂F/∂Lp = w             (1.5) 
and the after tax return to capital is        
 (1-t)A(Lg)∂F/∂K = r                              (1.6) 
from which it follows by Euler’s Theorem  that 
 (1-t)Y = w Lp +rK        (1.7)           
 The budget of the state can be written as: 
 tY = w Lg + S                                  (1.8) 
where w Lg is the cost of hiring public servants and S is the (non-negative) 
“surplus”, if any, that is extracted by the authorities in control of the state 
for their own use. Adding (1.7) and (1.8) we obtain 
 Y = w (Lp + Lg ) + r K + S = A(Lg )F(Lp, K)     (1.9) 
so that the output of the economy (equal to that of the private sector since 
public services are “intermediate” inputs) is equal to the sum of the after-




 This completes the description of the basic model1. Solution of the 
model requires the further specification of a maximand to determine all 
the unknowns of the problem as a necessary consequence. As the reader 
will note there are a number of alternatives, each of which will be 
examined in what follows. 
 
 Consider first the problem of a Philosopher-King, Platonic 
Guardian or Benevolent Despot, i.e. the problem of a state that acts in such 
a way as to maximize the welfare of the citizens, with no regard to the 
private interest of whoever wields power in the state. In this case public 
employment Lg will be chosen so as to maximize real national income Y, 
with the “surplus” S necessarily equal to zero. 
 
 The polar alternative is a completely “predatory” state, in which 
the “surplus” S is the maximand, with Lg, Y and other variables at 
whatever levels that result in the maximization of S itself. 
 
 A mixed case is a “principal-agent” situation in which the body of 
the citizens control the tax rate, knowing that the ruler will act so as to 
maximize his surplus subject to this tax rate. They must therefore choose 
the tax rate that will result in the maximum private consumption (Y – S). 
                                                 
1 This model was originally presented in Findlay and Wilson (1984). The present paper, however, extends 
the analysis further and obtains many more results. 
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Finally we can consider the cases of labor and capital acting as factional 
interest groups, lobbying to set Lg at whatever level that maximizes total 
wages wLg or profits rK. 
 
 
2. Problem of the Philosopher-King 
      The problem of the Philosopher King is to determine the national 
income-maximizing level of public goods. The level of public sector 
employment Lg is the control variable. Thus the problem is to choose Lg so 
as to:     
 Max Y =A(Lg)F(Lp,K)                                                  (2.1) 
subject to the sum of   Lg and  Lp  being equal to the fixed labor supply L. 
The necessary conditions for Y to be maximized is                          
 A'(LG)F(Lp, K) + A(Lg) FL dLP/dLg = 0     (2.2) 
Substituting dLP/d LG = -1 and rearranging terms we obtain:                                                   
 A'(Lg)F(Lp, K) = A(Lg) FL                                                                   (2.3)      
 
  At the optimum, the marginal product of labor in the public sector 
(the LHS of 2.3) must be equal to the marginal product of labor in the 
private sector (the RHS of 2.3), and thus also equal to the wage rate w.  
Denoting the LHS and the RHS by x and y respectively, we observe that 
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the marginal product of labor in the public as well as in the private sector 
diminishes since 
           dx/dLg = FA"(Lg) - A'(Lg) FL < 0                                                  ( 2.4)   
and 
            dy/dLp=A(Lg)FLL - A'(Lg) FL < 0                                                 ( 2.5)                                            
.   which means that the equilibrium point is interior and that it is unique. 
 
          As (2.3) shows, capital accumulation raises the productivity of labor 
in both sectors. In the Cobb-Douglas case an increase in K results in an 
equal increase in the marginal product of labor in both sectors. The 
optimal allocation  of labor remains, therefore, unchanged.  Improvements 
in government technology which leave unchanged the A′/A  ratio also 
have an equal impact on  the marginal labor product  in the private and in 
the public sectors. In this case, too, the equilibrium allocation is 
unaffected. One may, however, expect technical progress to occur at the 
margin, resulting in an  increase in the A′/A ratio. Such a change in 
government technology  raises the marginal product in the public sector 
more than in the private sector, hence, at optimum, it calls for the 
assignmrnt of a larger proportion of labor to the former.  
           
          The Philosopher-King devotes the entire tax revenue to the financing of the 
public good. The optimal tax rate t* is therefore:  
 t* = w* Lg*/Y*                                                                             ( 2.6) 
where asterisks denote the optimal values of the corresponding variables. 
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The optimal tax rate can be expressed in terms of the elasticity of A(Lg)  
with respect to Lg . Substituting  (1.1) and (1.5) into (2.6) and using (2.3) 
we get:   
 t* = [Lg* /A(Lg*)] [dA(Lg*)/dLg ]                                                (2.7)                                            
where A(Lg and A′(Lg) are  evaluated at the optimal Lg* 
          Fig 1 provides a graphic picture of the Philosopher King's problem.  
The total supply of labor is shown as 00'. Employment in the private 
sector is measured leftward from point 0' and public sector employment to 
the right from point 0. When society is in the Hobbesian "state of nature" 
there is no government and no public good. Hence all labor is employed in 
the private sector, and total income equals Yo.  As public sector 
employment rises, the efficiency of factors employed in production 
increases, and so does final output. The second derivative of output with 
respect to public sector employment is, however, negative. As labor is 
drawn increasingly into the public sector, the number of production 
workers is reduced and this, cet. par., depresses production. This tendency 
is counter-acted by the fact that public sector employment increases the 
productivity of the factors employed in the private sector.  When 0Lg* 
workers are employed in the public sector, national income reaches a 
maximum at 0Y*. If public employment exceeds 0Lg*, income falls. At 
0Lg# public employment is so high (and, as a consequence private 
employment is so low) that income is at the level at which it would be in 
the “State of Nature”. If all the workers were to be employed by the 
government in the production of the intermediate public good, no one 
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would work in the final product sector, and hence national income would 
be equal to zero. 
 
 
The relation between the level of government employment, and the 
wage rate is shown by the curve wow.  As the public sector expands, the 
wage rate rises continuously because (a) the higher the public 
employment, the smaller the number of workers in the private- sector, 
hence the higher the capital/labor ratio, and the higher the marginal 
product of labor, and (b) the higher the supply of the public good, the 
higher the productivity of both factors employed in the private sector. 
 
Under the assumption of a proportional, non-distortionary tax, the 











is at a maximum. In order to finance the income- maximizing supply of 
public goods, the Philosopher-King must set the tax rate at t*. In Fig. 1, 
the curve Oz*Lg# shows tax- revenue as a function of public sector 
employment, when the tax rate t is equal to t*. At zero public sector 
employment the income level (over and above Yo) is zero, hence 
government revenue R equals zero. Income (hence R) rises with Lg 
reaching a maximum at 0Lg*. When public employment is at the optimum 
level, the aggregate tax revenue is just equal to the aggregate government 
wage bill, as shown by the intersection of the 0L# curve with the wage 
curve wow curve at point z*. 
 
As the reader will note we have derived the “optimal size of the 
government” purely as a matter of technology, as specified by the 
functions A(Lg ) and F(Lp, K). So long as the objective is to maximize the 
final output of private consumer goods the resulting size of the 
government, whether large or small, that is necessary to achieve this is a 
purely instrumental matter quite independent of ideology.                                
 
3. Interest Groups: Labor, Capital, and the Size of Government 
In this section we investigate the question of the level of public 
employment, in other words the size of government, that would be favored 
by the separate social classes, workers and capitalists respectively. How 
will each of these solutions compare with the social optimum derived in  
the previous section?  Will it be true that workers will favor a larger size 
of government than the capitalists? 
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We begin with the interest of the workers. Clearly what they would 
collectively wish to maximize is the after-tax wage bill, which can be 
defined as: 
B  ≡ w(Lg )L = [1-t(Lg)]A(Lg) FL L      (3.1) 
and in which 
 t(Lg ) =   [w(Lg)Lg ] / [A(Lg ) F(Lp, K)] = G/Y    (3.2) 
i.e. the tax rate is the share of government expenditure in the national 
income, with no “surplus” being extracted by the government authorities 
for their own consumption. 
 
 The necessary condition for maximizing the wage bill w (Lg)L 
with respect to the level of public employment Lg is: 
 ∂w/∂ Lg = 0         (3.3) 
which occurs when 
 (1-t)[-A FLL + FL A′(Lg )] = A FL ∂t/∂ Lg      (3.4) 
This somewhat complicated expression is, however, not difficult to 
interpret. The expression in curly brackets is the derivative of the marginal 
product of labor in the private sector with respect to Lg: 
 ∂[∂Y/∂Lp ]/∂Lg  ≡   ∂[A(Lg)FL]/∂Lg                                                                       
The expression is clearly positive. The higher is Lg , the higher is A(Lg ) 
because A’(Lg ) is positive. Likewise, the higher is Lg, the higher is FL. 
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This is because FLL is negative, and Lp is reduced to the extent that Lg is 
increased. The LHS of (3.4) is the marginal benefit to the workers of an 
increase in Lg .The RHS of (3.4) is the impact of the rising tax rate that is  
necessitated by the increase in public employment on the pre-tax real 
wage A FL . The level of public employment Lg that maximizes the after-
tax wage bill is therefore at the point where the marginal benefit in net 
earnings (the LHS of 3.4) is equal to the infra-marginal increase in the tax 
on wages (the RHS of 3.4). 
 
 To confirm that the RHS of (3.4) is positive we note that: 
 ∂t/∂Lg  =  [FL (F + FL Lg ) - F FLL Lg ]/ (F + FL Lg )2 > 0   (3.5) 
since FLL is negative.   From equations (1.6) to (1.8) and letting S equal to 
zero enables us to express after-tax profits as: 
 r(Lg)K = Y(Lg ) – w(Lg ) L       (3.6) 
so that the first order condition 
 K(dr/d Lg ) = 0        (3.7) 
holds when  
 ∂Y/∂ Lg  = L(∂w/∂ Lg )       (3.8) 
 
 At the social optimum when Y is maximized at Y* we must have 
 K(dr/dLg ) + L(dw/dLg ) = ∂Y/∂Lg = 0     (3.9) 
 In (3.8) both sides must clearly be positive, i.e.for profits rK to be 
maximized, both national income Y and the wage bill wL must be 
increasing as Lg increases. In (3.9) the first and second terms must be of 
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opposite signs for Y to be mazimized at Y*. We know that   L(∂w/∂ Lg) in 
(3.8)  is positive when, in (3.7),  K(dr/dLg ) is equal to zero. It follows that  
in (3.9) K(dr/d Lg ) must be negative. This shows that profits are falling 
when Y is maximized at Y*, so the wage bill must be rising. Thus the 
wage bill is maximized, i.e. ∂w/∂Lg is equal to zero, as required by (3.3) 
only when Lg is greater than  Lg* 
 
 The relation between the three optimal values of Lg that maximize 
output, the after tax wage bill, and the after-tax capital income 
respectively is conveniently illustrated in Figure 2, which shows Y and wL 
as concave functions of Lg, each rising to a maximum and falling to zero 
when  Lg is equal to the entire labor force. From (3.6) we observe that  
r(Lg)K, after tax capital income, is equal to the vertical distance between  
Y(Lg ) and w (Lg)L at each value of  Lg . Thus after-tax profits r(Lg )K are 
maximized  when the slopes of the Y(Lg ) and w(Lg )L  functions are 
equal, as required by the first order conditions (3.7) and (3.8) Denoting 
this level of public employment by Lg#  we see that 
 Lg#  <  Lg*  < Lg        (3.10) 
i.e. capitalists would want a smaller and workers a larger size of 
government, as measured by the level of public employment, than what is 














Since the level of public employment is positively related to the tax rate it 
follows immediately that  
 t# <  t* < t                                        (3.11)                                           
  i.e. workers would favor a higher and capitalists a lower than socially 
optimal tax rate t* 
 
 Up till now we have treated the “pure” case of exclusive capitalist 
and worker classes as in the work of Karl Marx. More realistically, let 
each of the individuals in the society have their own endowment vector 
(Ki , Li ) where the sum over all individuals yields the aggregate K and L. 
Y(Lg)






We could compute by the same reasoning as above the optimal Lgi that 
maximizes: 
 Yi (Lgi ) = w(Lgi )Li + r(Lgi )Ki                              (3.12) 
and the corresponding tax rate t i . These individual tax rates would be 
bounded from below by t# and from above by t with t i decreasing as a 
function of the capital-labor ratios that the individuals are endowed with. 
 
 A popular “political economy” decision-rule is the so-called 
“median voter theorem” in which the median individual’s Lg i or ti  
prevails. If every individual voted and the distribution of capital 
ownership were highly skewed the democratic process would result in an 
over-expansion of public employment compared with the socially-optimal 
mean capital-labor ratio K/L and there would be redistribution of income 
toward the poor. However if the poor are apathetic, or if political 
organization  requires resources  that the rich are better able to afford it 
will be  more likely that public employment will be below the social 
optimum. 
 
4. The Leviathan 
 
Consider an autocrat whose only goal is appropriate for himself the 
maximum possible income from the resources of the state over which he 
rules. We shall call this the case of a pure “Leviathan”, though as we have 
seen Hobbes himself had a much more subtle conception of the self-
interest of his absolute ruler. 
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The Leviathan’s problem can be conceived as setting public 
employment Lg and the tax rate t so as to 
Max t[Y(Lg ) – Yo ] = t{A(Lg ) F(Lp, K) - Yo ] (4.1)  
subject to constraints (1.2) to (1.4).                                    
 
           It is immediately apparent that his objective will be attained by 
setting Lg equal to Lg*  to maximize Y at Y* as in the Philosopher King’s 
problem solved in Section 2 above, but the tax rate will be set at unity 
instead of at  t*, the “socially necessary” level needed to finance the 
optimal public expenditure w* Lg . In other words, the Leviathan will 
appropriate for himself the entire “surplus” (Y* - Yo) over anarchy, 
instead of leaving it entirely to his subjects, as is the case of the 
benevolent Philosopher-King. It is obvious that these two cases define the 
polar limits, with the tax rate being set between t* and unity out of 
whatever mixture of benevolence or prudence on the part of the autocrat 
were to prevail in any particular case. 
  
5. The Tax- Constrained Leviathan 
No rulers have ever enjoyed the freedom to set taxes at will. In the  
Middle Ages the European kings’ and princes’ power to tax was 
constrained by custom, which gradually evolved into law. Attempts to 
raise the tax level without parliamentary consent cost Charles I his head, 
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and were among the major causes of the American and French 
Revolutions. Even Eastern potentates, as noted by Hume, did not have the 
unrestricted power to tax: “The sultan is master of life and fortune of any 
individual; but will not be permitted to impose a new tax on his subjects"2. 
In the modern era parliamentary control includes, in principle, the public 
expenditure side. The formal arrangements notwithstanding, the executive 
has much leeway in deciding how to use public funds.  
 
            Consider the problem of a Leviathan who seeks to maximize the 
“surplus” he appropriates for himself, i.e., the difference between tY, the 
revenue he collects in taxes, and the expenditure on the public good, wLg,  
but who has to accept the tax rate t as given. 
 
 It will be instructive in what follows to take the given tax rate for 
the Ruler as equal to t*, the same rate of tax that enables the Philosopher 
King to secure the social optimum by public expenditure of w* Lg*.to 
attain a national income of Y*. We will see how a self-interested Ruler 
will deviate from the behavior of his altruistic counterpart even if he were 
to be granted the identical taxing power by the citizens. 
 
 The tax-constrained Leviathan’s problem is to set Lg so as to 
                                                 
2  Essay IV, “ Of the First Principles of Government”, Hume (1963) p. 30.  
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           Max S = t*Y(Lg ) – w(Lg ) Lg       (5.1) 
The first-order condition for which is: 
 t * (∂Y/∂Lg ) = w{1 + 1/σ}      (5.2) 
where 
 σ ≡ (w/Lg )dLg /dw       
is the elasticity of supply of labor from the private sector to the Ruler for 
employment in  public service. The interpretation of (5.2) is now very 
simple. The LHS is the marginal revenue to the Ruler from hiring one 
more public servant and the RHS is the marginal cost. 
  
 Substituting the production function (1.1) and the corresponding 
after tax wage into (5.1) the Ruler’s problem can now be expressed as:                   
 
 Max S = t*A(Lg ) F(Lp ,K) –  (1-t*)A(Lg ) FL Lg    (5.3)       
               Lg 
So that the first-order condition now is: 
 
t*[A′(Lg )F(Lp ,K) - A (Lg )FL] = 
  = (1-t*)A(Lg )FL { 1 + Lg [A′(Lg)  FL – A(Lg )FLL]/ A (Lg )FL }  (5.4) 
 
which has exactly the same interpretation for this specific production 
function as (5.2).The first term in the bracket on the LHS is the marginal 
product of labor in the public sector while the second is its opportunity 
cost, the marginal product of labor in the private sector.. As we saw in the 
case of the Philosopher-King these two have to be equal at the social 
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optimum, so that the LHS would be zero.  In the present case of the tax-
constrained but self-interested Ruler it is positive, with the level of public 
employment Lg below its socially optimal level, yielding a positive 
marginal revenue at t* to the Ruler. The RHS is the monopsonistic 
marginal cost of hiring public servants from the private sector, with the 
elasticity of labor supply σ in this case given by 
 
 σ ≡ [A( Lg )FL / Lg ][ 1/ [A′(Lg ) – A(Lg ) FLL ]     
 
 Figure 3 illustrates the situation. The hump-shaped curve shows 
revenue t*Y(Lg ) rising to a maximum at  Lg* and declining thereafter to 
zero at  Lg equal to L. The convex curve shows public expenditure 
w (Lg) Lg . It intersects the revenue function t*Y(Lg )  at the peak where  
Lg equals  Lg*, indicating that  revenue t*Y* at this point is exactly equal 
to the necessary public expenditure wLg* to sustain the socially optimal 




 The self-interested Ruler, however, does not put Lg equal to Lg*. 
National income would be maximized at Y*, but he would get nothing for 
himself since all of the revenue t*Y* would have to be spent on w Lg*. 
Instead, he would set public employment at the lower level Lg where the 
slope of the revenue function is equal to that of the public expenditure 
function, as required by the first order conditions expressed by (5.2) or 
(5.4). National income and therefore revenue are lower than at Lg*, but the 
“surplus” S is maximized at: 
 S = t*Y(Lg ) – w(Lg ) Lg                           
The public’s consumption is therefore reduced to: 










by comparison with what is obtained under the benign rule of the 
Philosopher King. 
 
6. Rulers, Parliament, and the Tax Rate: The Principal-Agent Problem 
 
 The previous section has shown that a self-interested Ruler, even 
though constrained by a tax rate fixed by a representative assembly of 
citizens, will produce less than the optimal amount of public inputs and 
extract some of the reduced output for his own consumption or that of his 
favored associates. The question that arises is what tax rate should the 
citizens specify to maximize their own consumption, equal to the national 
income minus the “surplus” extracted by the Ruler, when they understand 
that he will always maximize the “surplus” that he can extract at each 
given tax rate. 
 
 In other words we can consider the representative assembly or 
Parliament as the Principal, and the Ruler as their Agent, whom they wish 
to induce to act in their own best interest even though they know full well 
that he will always act in his own. In the language of modern theory this is 
a familiar “principal-agent” problem that can be set up as follows: 
 The Principal, or Parliament wishes to: 
 24
 
 Maximize  Y[Lg (t)] –S[Lg (t), t)]         (6.1) 
         t                                             
subject to the condition that the Agent or the Ruler will            
 Maximize Y[Lg (t)] – S[Lg (t), t] (6.2)  
                 Lg      
for any given t 
 The first-order condition for the solution is that: 
 (∂Y/∂Lg)(dLg /dt) -  (∂S/∂Lg )(dLg /dt) - ∂S/∂t  =  0    (6.3)          
but since we know that the Agent will always choose Lg so at to maximize 
S for any given t, this reduces to: 
   (∂Y/∂Lg)(dLg /dt) = ∂S/∂t         (6.4) 
With the technology of the basic model of Section 1, (6.4) can be written 
as:    
[A′(Lg )F(Lp, K) – A(Lg) FL ] dLg /dt = A(Lg) F(Lp , K) + A(Lg) FL Lg    (6.5) 
 
 This condition is readily interpreted. The LHS is the net increase in 
output resulting from an increase in public employment induced by the 
incentive to the Ruler in the form of a higher tax rate. This same tax 
increase, however, extracts more revenue from the corresponding tax base, 
which is gross income (Y + Lg ) on the RHS of (6.5). The optimal tax rate 
for Parliament t# is therefore at the point where these marginal benefits 
and costs are exactly equal.       
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 The solution is depicted in Figure 4 which shows the function  
Y[Lg (t)] and S[Lg (t), t] with Y and S on the vertical axis and t on the 
horizontal. The consumption of the public C equal to (Y – S) is the 
vertical distance between these functions at each tax- rate t. It is 
maximized at t#, where the slopes of the two functions are equal. Both 
national income and the Ruler’s “surplus” are equal to Y* when t is equal 
to unity, as shown in Section 4 on the pure Leviathan. 
 
7. Concluding Comments 
    This paper has examined the question of resource allocation between 
the public and private sectors of a competitive market economy. We show 
that under reasonable assumptions the socially optimal government is not 
0







zero –as by anarchists and extreme libertarians3. Nor is it as extensive as it 
would have to be for government operations themselves to be carried to 
the point of maximum efficiency, i.e. if the marginal productivity of the 
‘last’ constable or magistrate were to be equal to zero. The optimal size  is 
when the contribution of public servants is equal, at the margin, to their 
opportunity cost in the private sector.This solution would be achieved 
either by a purely disinterested Philosopher-King or a completely 
autocratic Leviathan.The difference of course would be that the citizens 
consume all the income in the first case but none of it (above the anarchy 
level) in the second. 
 
      An interesting case, applicable to a wide range of historical situations, 
is when the Ruler has the discretion to allocate public revenue between 
productive expenditures benefiting market activities or to the personal 
satisfaction of maintaining his retinue and ‘court’, but the power to tax is 
controlled by Parliament or some representative body of the citizens. 
Maximization by the Ruler of the ‘surplus’ between tax-revenue at the 
permitted rate and productive public expenditure results in a positive but 
less than socially optimal supply of the public good. In terms of Max 
Weber’s definition of the state as the ‘natural monopoly’ for the provision 
of legitimate force it is perhaps not surprising that it would extract the 
associated monopoly rent. 
                                                 
3 See, for instance, Rothbard (1973). 
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        What tax-rate set by Parliament would result in the maximum 
consumption available to the citizens after the Ruler extracts the surplus 
associated with that rate? We saw that the rate must be such that the net 
benefit to the citizens of the incremental public services that the ruler is 
induced to provide by the higher tax-rate is just equal to the additional 
revenue that he is enabled to extract. This ‘principal-agent’ problem has 
wide relevance in a variety of situations involving the resolution of  
complementary but also competing interests between Rulers and 
Parliaments. A familiar problem is the appropriate additional taxes to 
grant in times of war or other national emergencies. Parliaments have to 
resolve the dilemma of granting too little to allow the Ruler to deal 
satisfactorily with the emergency, or too much so as to permit him to 
enhance his personal interests at the public’s expense. 
 
             Political economy is not only concerned with conflicts of interest 
between the executive and the public as a whole but also between different 
elements or ‘factions’ within it. Our model has considered the differing 
interests of labor and capital with respect to the size of government. It 
demonstrates that while each group benefits by the existence of the state, 
labor would prefer a larger government and a higher tax-rate than the 
social optimum, while capital would prefer a smaller. This is clearly in 
accord with empirical observation, at least in developed countries. 
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 We also show that democracy comes at a cost. The polity is better 
off under a parliamentary regime than under a self-serving Leviathan. But, 
save for exceptional cases, the parliamentary solutions are inefficient4. 
The level of public goods provided by a tax-constrained Leviathan or by a 
capital-dominated Parliament is lower than the level that maximizes 
aggregate income; a labor-dominated Parliament favors an excessive 
volume of public goods. In either case, a higher level of aggregate income 
could be achieved under absolute rule. An absolute ruler could, in theory, 
take over a democratic country, extract a surplus for himself, yet leave the 
citizens in no worse a position than before. History shows, however, that, 
save for a few exceptions, people are better off under an inefficient 
democratic system than under an efficient autocrat. 
               We thus hope to have demonstrated that highly abstract and 
simple though it is, our basic model and approach is nevertheless 
sufficiently rich and flexible to be used as a tool in tackling the great 
themes of political economy that we will be pursuing in what follows.  
          
 
 
                                                 
4  It can readily be shown that the parliamentary solution is efficient if (1) the median voter’s ratio of capital 
to labor endowment is equal to the average ratio of all community members or (2) contrary to our 
assumptions, the factor intensity of the public sector is equal to that in the private sector. 
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